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Abstract
We consider the problem of probabilistically allocating a single
indivisible good among agents when monetary transfers are allowed.
We construct a new strategy-proof rule, called the second price trad-
ing rule, and show that it is second best ecient. Furthermore, we
give the second price trading rule three characterizations with (1)
strategy-proofness, \budget-balance", equal treatment of equals, weak
decision-eciency, and simple generatability, (2) strategy-proofness,
\equal rights lower bound", equal treatment of equals, weak decision-
eciency, and simple generatability, (3) strategy-proofness, \envy-
freeness, no-trade-no-transfer", equal treatment of equals, weak decision-
eciency, and simple generatability.
Keywords: Strategy-proofness, Probabilistic allocation problem, Second
price trading rule, Budget-balance, Second best eciency
JEL Classication numbers: D71, D78
1 Introduction
We study the probabilistic allocation problem of a single indivisible good
among agents when monetary compensations are possible. Each agent has
a preference expressed by quasi-linear utility function and maximizes his ex-
pected utility. A rule determines an assignment probability of the indivisible
good and a monetary transfer to each agent for each preference prole. We
Corresponding address: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University,
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, JAPAN. E-mail: k-hashimoto@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp
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consider incentive-compatible rules that elicit the preference of each agent.
We especially focus on strategy-proof rule, where the truthful report of one's
preference is always dominant strategy.
On the deterministic allocation problems, many researches have stud-
ied the class of the Groves rules, which is the only class of rules satisfy-
ing strategy-proofness and decision-eciency [Holmstrom (1979)]. Decision-
eciency requires that the good is assigned to an agent who has the high-
est value. Among them, the Vickery (1961) rule1 is one of the most ana-
lyzed rules. It is well-known that the Vickery rule is the only deterministic
rule satisfying strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-positive trans-
fer, and either decision-eciency [Holmstrom (1979)], envy-freeness [Svens-
son (1983)], or equal treatment of equals2 (anonymity)3 [Ashlagi and Serizawa
(2012)]. Individual rationality requires that no one be worse o than the
initial state. Non-positive transfer requires that any agent's transfer be non-
positive. Envy-freeness requires that no one prefer other agent's assignment
to his own. Equal treatment of equals requires that the agents who have
the same preference be treated equally. Anonymity requires that a rule be
dened independently of the names of the agents.4
Although the Vickery rule has excellent features, it has also several draw-
backs. A well-known drawback is that the Vickery rule does not satisfy
budget-balance. Budget-balance requires that the total amount of monetary
transfers is always zero. This implies that monetary transfers ow out of
agents. This drawback is, however, not particular to the Vickery rule, because
all the Groves rules do not satisfy budget-balance [Green and Laont (1977)].
Furthermore, even if we consider nitely restricted domains, there exists no
deterministic rule satisfying strategy-proofness, budget-balance, and5 neither
decision-eciency [Ohseto (2000)], envy-freeness [Ohseto (2000)], nor equal
treatment of equals [Kato et al. (2015)]. Hence, it is very dicult to achieve
budget-balance among deterministic rules.6
To improve welfares of agents but not achieving budget-balance, the Bai-
1Sometimes, this rule is called VCG [Vickery (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973)]
rule.
2Strictly speaking, the results on the deterministic model are valid with equal treatment
of equals in welfare or anonymity in welfare.
3See also Sakai (2013).
4Anonymity implies equal treatment of equals.
5Ando et al. (2008) have constructed a rule satisfying strategy-proofness, budget-
balance, individual rationality, and weak symmetry on heavily restricted domain.
6Fujinaka (2008) has designed an outstanding rule, which satises Bayesian incentive
compatibility, individual rationality, budget-balance, decision-eciency, envy-freeness, and
anonymity, but does not strategy-proofness.
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ley (1997) rule has been recently paid attention by many researchers.7 The
Bailey rule is a redistribution rule of some payments of Vickery rule maintain-
ing strategy-proofness, decision-eciency, and individual rationality [Porter
et al. (2004) and Cavallo (2006)]. The Bailey rule has excellent features
for eciency and fairness. Not only there exists no Groves rule that Pareto-
dominates the Bailey rule [Guo et al. (2013)], but also the Bailey rule satises
anonymity and other condition of fairness [Porter et al. (2004)]. Although
the Bailey rule does not satisfy envy-freeness, this drawback is inevitable
among deterministic rules, because any rule satisfying strategy-proofness,
anonymity, envy-freeness, and individual rationality is dominated by some
strategy-proof rule [Sprumont (2013)].
Other drawback of the Vickery rule is that it does not satisfy equal rights
lower bound. Equal rights lower bound8 requires that any agent's assignment
be at least better than the equal assignment. This drawback is also not
particular to the Vickery rule, because there exists no deterministic rule
satisfying strategy-proofness and equal rights lower bound [Moulin (2010)].
Hence, in order to overcome these drawbacks, we need expand the research
scope from deterministic rules to probabilistic ones. Among probabilistic
rules, there exist many rules satisfying strategy-proofness, budget-balance,
equal rights lower bound, and envy-freeness. For example, the rule which al-
ways assigns the indivisible good with the equal probability and no monetary
transfer to each agent trivially satises these desirable properties. However,
by Holmstrom's (1979) theorem, it is impossible to design a probabilistic rule
satisfying strategy-proofness and Pareto-eciency. Thus, the rst interesting
question we should answer is \what rule satisfying these desirable properties
is second best ecient?" After then, the second interesting question is \Is it
the only rule satisfying desirable properties?"
To answer the questions, we construct a new rule, called the second price
trading rule, which satises strategy-proofness, budget-balance, equal rights
lower bound, and envy-freeness. Then, we show that this rule is second best
ecient. Furthermore, we show that the second price trading rule is only
rule satisfying strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, weak decision-
eciency, simple generatability, and either budget-balance or equal rights
lower bound. Weak decision-eciency requires that almost all probability
be assigned the agent(s) who has the rst highest value, and all probability
be assigned the agents who have at least the second highest value. Simple
generatability requires that the probability can be generated by a simple
7See Porter et al. (2004), Cavallo (2006), Atlamaz and Yengin (2008), Guo and Conitzer
(2009), Moulin (2009), Moulin (2010), and Clippel et al. (2014).
8This property is called unanimity lower bound by Moulin (2010).
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device. We also show that the second price trading rule is only rule satisfying
strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, weak decision-eciency, simple
generatability, envy-freeness, and no-trade-no-transfer. No-trade-no-transfer
requires that when all agents get the equal probability, their transfers are
zero.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the model.
Section 3 introduces a new rule. Section 4 denes axioms. Section 5 states
results. Section 6 veries independence of axioms. All proofs are provided
in Section 7.
2 Model
Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be the set of agents, where we assume n  3. We con-
sider an environment with a single indivisible good, hereafter called good, and
one divisible good called money. The good can be allocated probabilistically.
Each agent i 2 N has a preference over bundles consisting of a probabil-
ity si 2 [0; 1] that he gets the good and a monetary transfer ti 2 R that he
receives. We assume that this preference is represented by a utility function
ui(si; ti) = sivi + ti for some vi 2 V  R+. Since a preference is identi-
ed by vi, we regard vi and V as the preference and the set of preferences,
respectively. We call a list v  (vi)i2N 2 V n a preference prole.
The set of feasible allocations is
Z = f(si; ti)i2N 2 ([0; 1] R)n :
X
i2N
si = 1 and
X
i2N
ti  0g:
A rule is a function f : V n ! Z. Given a rule f and a preference prole
v 2 V n, we denote by fi(v)  (si(v); ti(v)) 2 [0; 1]  R agent i's assignment
under f(v). For any v 2 V n and N 0  N , let vN 0 2 V #N 0 and v N 0 2 V #NnN 0
denote (vj)j2N 0 and (vj)j =2N 0 , respectively.
3 New Rule
To dene a new rule, we need some notation. For any v 2 V n, let denote
v(1) and v(2) the rst and the second highest value among v, respectively. In
formally, v(1) = maxi2N vi and v(2) = maxi2Nnfig vi where i 2 argmaxi2N vi.
So, v(1) = v(2) may occur. For any v 2 V n, dene [1v] = fi 2 N : vi = v(1)g
and [2v] = fi 2 N : vi = v(2)g. Notice that [1v] = [2v] when v(1) = v(2).
Then, we introduce the new rule. It is just like a trading rule as follow.
Initially, all agents have the equal probability 1
n
. They trade the probability
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at the second price v(2). The agents in [1v] are buyers, and the others are
sellers, except the case #[1v] = 1 and #[2v] = 1, where the agent in [2v]
is neither buyer nor seller. Each seller sells the initial probability 1
n
. Each
buyer buys equally the sold probability.
Denition The second price trading rule is dened as follows. For any
v 2 V n, when #[1v] = 1 and #[2v] = 1,
fi(v) =
8><>:
(n 1
n
; n 2
n
v(2)) if i 2 [1v];
( 1
n
; 0) if i 2 [2v];
(0; 1
n
v(2)) otherwise,
and when #[1v] = 1 and #[2v] > 1,
fi(v) =
(
(1; n 1
n
v(2)) if i 2 [1v];
(0; 1
n
v(2)) otherwise,
and when #[1v] > 1
fi(v) =
(
( 1
#[1v]
; ( 1
#[1v]
  1
n
)v(2)) if i 2 [1v];
(0; 1
n
v(2)) otherwise.
4 Axioms
We introduce some properties that the second price trading rule satises.
First, strategy-proofness says that it is a dominant strategy for any agent to
report his true preference.
Denition A rule f satises strategy-proofness (SP) if for any v 2 V n,
any i 2 N , and any v0i 2 V , it holds that
si(v)vi + ti(v)  si(v0i; v i)vi + ti(v0i; v i):
Second best eciency says that the rule is in the Pareto frontier among
strategy-proof rules.
Denition A strategy-proof rule f is second best ecient if there does
not exist other strategy-proof rule f  such that for any v 2 V n and any
i 2 N ,
si (v)vi + t

i (v)  si(v)vi + ti(v);
and for some v 2 V n and some j 2 N ,
sj(v)vj + t

j(v) > sj(v)vj + tj(v):
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Budget balance says that the transfers among agents are closed.
Denition A rule f satises budget balance (BB) if for any v 2 V n, it
holds that X
i2N
ti(v) = 0:
Equal treatment of equals says that the agents who have the same pref-
erence get the same assignment.
Denition A rule f satises equal treatment of equals (ETE) if for
any v 2 V n and any i; j 2 N , if vi = vj, then it holds that
fi(v) = fj(v):
Equal rights lower bound says that the assignment is at least better than
the equal assignment ( 1
n
; 0).
Denition A rule f satises equal rights lower bound (ERLB) if for
any v 2 V n and any i 2 N , it holds that
si(v)vi + ti(v)  1
n
vi:
Envy-freeness says that no agent prefers another agent's assignment to
his own assignment.
Denition A rule f satises envy-freeness (EF) if for any v 2 V n and
any i; j 2 N , it holds that
si(v)vi + ti(v)  sj(v)vi + tj(v):
No-trade-no-transfer says that when all agents get the equal probability
1
n
, their transfers are zero.
Denition A rule f satises no-trade-no-transfer (NTNT) if for any
v 2 V n if for any i 2 N ,
si(v) =
1
n
;
then for any i 2 N , it holds that
ti(v) = 0:
Weak decision-eciency says that almost all probability is assigned the
agent(s) whose valuation is the rst highest, and all probability is assigned
the agents whose valuations are at least the second highest.
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Denition A rule f satises weak decision-eciency (wDE) if for any
v 2 V n, it holds that X
i2[1]
si(v)  n  1
n
;
and X
i2[1][[2]
si(v) = 1:
Simple generatability says that the probability can be generated by a
simple device, like n balls.
Denition A rule f satises simple generatability (SG) if for any v 2
V n and any i 2 N , there exist some non-negative integers m;m0  n such
that
si(v) =
m0
m
:
5 Results
We state the results. All proofs are provided in the nal section. The rst
result says that the new rule satises our main axiom, strategy-proofness.
Theorem 1 The second price trading rule satises strategy-proofness.
The next result says that the new rule is in the frontier among strategy-
proof rules.
Theorem 2 The second price trading rule is second best ecient.
From the above result, we can say that the new rule is not bad. To say
that the new rule is good, we need to show that the new rule has a special
feature. The next three results say that the new rule is the only rule satisfying
good properties.
Theorem 3 A rule satises strategy-proofness, budget-balance, equal treat-
ment of equals, weak decision-eciency, and simple generatability if and only
if it is the second price trading rule.
Theorem 4 A rule satises strategy-proofness, equal rights lower bound,
equal treatment of equals, weak decision-eciency, and simple generatability
if and only if it is the second price trading rule.
7
Theorem 5 A rule satises strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, no-trade-no-
transfer, equal treatment of equals, weak decision-eciency, and simple gen-
eratability if and only if it is the second price trading rule.
6 Independence of Axioms
We verify that none of the axioms in Theorems 3, 4, and 5 is redundant. We
exhibit rules that satisfy all but one of the axioms. Let n = 3.
Example 1 (not SP) Let f be as follows: for any v 2 V 3 and any i 2 N ,
when #[1v] = 3,
fi(v) = (
1
3
; 0);
and when #[1v] < 3,
fi(v) =
(
( 1
#[1v ]
; ( 1
#[1v ]
  1
3
)v(1)) if i 2 [1v];
(0; 1
3
v(1)) otherwise.
This rule satises all but not strategy-proofness.
Example 2 (not ETE) Let f be as follows: for any v 2 V 3, when v =
(0; 0; 0),
f1(v) = (1; 0) and f2(v) = f3(v) = (0; 0);
and when v 6= (0; 0; 0),
f(v) is determined by the second price trading rule.
This rule satises all but not equal treatment of equals.
Example 3 (not wDE) Let f be as follows: for any v 2 V 3 and any i 2 N ,
fi(v) = (
1
3
; 0);
This rule satises all but not weak decision-eciency.
Example 4 (not SG) Let f be as follows: for any v 2 V 3 and any i 2 N ,
when for some  > 0, v = (; 0; 0), v = (0; ; 0), or v = (0; 0; ),
fi(v) =
(
(2
3
; 0) if i 2 [1v];
(1
6
; 0) otherwise,
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and when the other cases,
f(v) is determined by the second price trading rule.
This rule satises all but not simple generatability.
Example 5 (not BB, not ERLB, not NTNT) Given  > 0. Let f be
as follows: for any v 2 V 3 and any i 2 N ,
si(v) is determined by the second price trading rule;
and
ti(v) =   + his transfer determined by the second price trading rule.
This rule satises all but not budget-balance, not equal rights lower bound,
and not no-trade-no-transfer.
Example 6 (not BB, not ERLB, not EF) Given  > 0. Let f be as
follows: for any v 2 V 3 and any i 2 N ,
si(v) is determined by the second price trading rule;
and when #fj 2 N : vj = 0g = 2 and i 2 fj 2 N : vj = 0g,
ti(v) =   + his transfer determined by the second price trading rule,
and when #fj 2 N : vj = 0g = 2 and i =2 fj 2 N : vj = 0g,
ti(v) = his transfer determined by the second price trading rule,
and when #fj 2 N : vj = 0g = 1 and i 2 fj 2 N : vj = 0g,
ti(v) = his transfer determined by the second price trading rule,
and when #fj 2 N : vj = 0g = 1 and i =2 fj 2 N : vj = 0g,
ti(v) =   + his transfer determined by the second price trading rule,
and when the other cases,
ti(v) = his transfer determined by the second price trading rule.
This rule satises all but not budget-balance, not equal rights lower bound,
and not envy-freeness.
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7 Proofs
Throughout the all proofs, we use the following Lemma which have been
shown by Myerson (1981).
Lemma (Myerson, 1981) A rule f satises strategy-proofness if and only
if for any i 2 N , any vi; v0i 2 V such that vi  v0i, and any v i 2 V n 1, it
holds that
si(vi; v i)  si(v0i; v i);
and that
ti(vi; v i) = ti(0; v i)  si(vi; v i)vi +
Z vi
0
si(xi; v i)dxi:
From this, we also have the following easily.9 If a rule f satises strategy-
proofness, then for any i 2 N , any vi; v0i 2 V such that vi  v0i, and any
v i 2 V n 1, it holds that
ti(v
0
i; v i) = ti(vi; v i)  si(v0i; v i)v0i + si(vi; v i)vi +
Z v0i
vi
si(xi; v i)dxi:
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We show that the second price trading rule satises strategy-proofness. Let
f denote the second price trading rule. Let i 2 N . Let v 2 V n. We divide
the argument into two cases.
Case 1. The number of agent whose valuation is the rst highest in
N n fig is 1.
Let vi1 ; vi2 2 V denote the rst and the second highest valuation in N n fig,
respectively. Note that
si(v) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if vi  vi2 ;
1
n
if vi2 < vi < vi1 ;
1
2
if vi = vi1 ;
n 1
n
if vi1 < vi:
Note also that
ti(0; v i) =
1
n
vi2 :
9Subtract ti(vi; v i) from ti(v0i; v i).
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Then, it follows that
ti(0; v i) si(vi; v i)vi+
Z vi
0
si(xi; v i)dxi =
8>>><>>>:
1
n
vi2 if vi  vi2 ;
0 if vi2 < vi < vi1 ;
 (1
2
  1
n
)vi1 if vi = vi1 ;
 n 2
n
vi1 if vi1 < vi:
Thus, we have ti(vi; v i) = ti(0; v i)  si(vi; v i)vi +
R vi
0
si(xi; v i)dxi. Then,
Myerson's Lemma implies that f satises strategy-proofness.
Case 2. The number of agents whose valuations are the rst highest in
N n fig is more than 1.
Let m denote the number of agents whose valuations are the rst highest in
N n fig. Let vi1 2 V denote the rst highest valuation in N n fig. Note that
si(v) =
8><>:
0 if vi < vi1 ;
1
m+1
if vi = vi1 ;
1 if vi1 < vi:
Note also that
ti(0; v i) =
1
n
vi1 :
Then, it follows that
ti(0; v i)  si(vi; v i)vi +
Z vi
0
si(xi; v i)dxi =
8><>:
1
n
vi1 if vi < vi1 ;
 ( 1
m+1
  1
n
)vi1 if vi = vi1 ;
 n 1
n
vi1 if vi1 < vi:
Thus, we have ti(vi; v i) = ti(0; v i)  si(vi; v i)vi +
R vi
0
si(xi; v i)dxi. Then,
Myerson's Lemma implies that f satises strategy-proofness.
2
7.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We show that the second price trading rule is the second best ecient. Let
f denote the second price trading rule. Let f  be a strategy-proof rule as
follows: for any v 2 V n, it holds that
si (v)vi + t

i (v)  si(v)vi + ti(v): (1)
Let v 2 V n. For simplicity of notation, we assume 1 2 [1v] and 2 2 [2v]. We
divide the argument into three cases.
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Case 1: #[1v] = 1 and #[2v] > 1.
Note that
fi(v) =
(
(1; n 1
n
v2) if i 2 [1v];
(0; 1
n
v2) otherwise:
We claim that s1(v) = 1. Suppose to the contrary that s

1(v) < 1. Then,
from (1), we have
s1(v)v2 + t

1(v) > s1(v)v2 + t1(v):
For any i 6= 1, from (1), we also have
si (v)v2 + t

i (v)  si(v)v2 + ti(v):
By summing up these inequalities, it follows that
v2 > v2;
which is a contradiction. So, we have
s1(v) = 1:
This implies for any i 6= 1,
si (v) = 0:
So, for any i 2 N , it holds that
ti (v) = ti(v):
Case 2: #[1v] = 1 and #[2v] = 1.
Note that
fi(v) =
8><>:
(n 1
n
; n 2
n
v2) if i 2 [1v];
( 1
n
; 0) if i 2 [2v];
(0; 1
n
v2) otherwise,
By case 1, it holds that
f 2 (v^2; v 2) = (0;
1
n
v^2);
where v^2 = v(3). Since f
 satises SP, it follows that
1
n
v^2  s2(v)v^2 + t2(v): (2)
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By combining the inequalities (1) and (2), we have
(s2(v) 
1
n
)(v2   v^2)  0:
Since v2   v^2 > 0, this implies that
s2(v) 
1
n
:
We claim that s2(v) =
1
n
. Suppose to the contrary that s2(v) >
1
n
. Then, for
any i 2 N , from (1), we have
si (v)v1 + t

i (v)  si(v)v1 + ti(v);
where the inequality is strict for agent 2. By summing up these inequalities,
it follows that
v1 > v1;
which is a contradiction. So, we have
s2(v) =
1
n
:
This implies that
s1(v) 
n  1
n
:
We claim that s1(v) =
n 1
n
. Suppose to the contrary that s1(v) <
n 1
n
. Then,
from (1), we have
s1(v)v2 + t

1(v) > s1(v)v2 + t1(v):
For any i 6= 1, from (1), we also have
si (v)v2 + t

i (v)  si(v)v2 + ti(v):
By summing up these inequalities, it follows that
v2 > v2;
which is a contradiction. So, we have
s1(v) =
n  1
n
:
This implies for any i 6= 1; 2,
si (v) = 0:
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So, for any i 2 N , it holds that
ti (v) = ti(v):
Case 3: #[1v] > 1.
Note that
fi(v) =
(
( 1
#[1v ]
; ( 1
#[1v ]
  1
n
)v1) if i 2 [1v];
(0; 1
n
v1) otherwise,
We claim that for any j =2 [1v], sj(v) = 0. Suppose to the contrary that for
some h =2 [1v], sh(v) > 0. Then, from (1), we have
sh(v)v1 + t

h(v) > sh(v)v1 + th(v):
For any j =2 [1v], from (1), we also have
sj(v)v1 + t

j(v)  sj(v)v1 + tj(v):
Note that X
i2[1v ]
si (v)v1 +
X
i2[1v]
ti (v) 
X
i2[1v]
si(v)v1 +
X
i2[1v ]
ti(v):
By summing up these inequalities, we haveX
i2N
si (v)v1 +
X
i2N
ti (v) >
X
i2N
si(v)v1 +
X
i2N
ti(v);
which implies v1 > v1, a contradiction. So, for any j =2 [1v], we have
sj(v) = 0:
Then, for any j =2 [1v], it follows that
tj(v) = tj(v):
These imply that for any i 2 [1v], it holds that
si (v)vi + t

i (v) = si(v)vi + ti(v):
Thus, f is the second best ecient.
2
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7.3 Proof of Theorem 3
In the following, for any partition (I; C;O) of N where some set may be
empty, we use the notation v = (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) in which for any i; j 2 I, any
k 2 C, and any h; h0 2 O, v1i = v1j > vk > v0h = v0h0 , where v1i and v0h are any
values in V .
Let f be a rule satisfying SP, BB, ETE, wDE, and SG. We show that
for any v 2 V n, f(v) coincides with the allocation determined by the second
price trading rule. To do so, we prove the following induction.
1. (A0) For any (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n such that #C = 1 and #I = 1,
f(v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) coincides with the allocation determined by the second
price trading rule.
(B0) For any (v1I ; v
0
O) 2 V n, f(v1I ; v0O) also do.
2. Given any integer c such that 2  c  n  2. If
(A) for any (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n such that #C  c   1 and #I = 1,
f(v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) coincides with the allocation determined by the second
price trading rule, and
(B) for any (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n such that #C  c   2 and I 6= ;,
f(v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) also do, then
(A0) for any (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n such that #C = c and #I = 1, f(v1I ; vC ; v0O)
also do, and
(B0) for any (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n such that #C = c   1 and I 6= ;,
f(v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) also do.
The First Part.
Before proving (A0) and (B0), we show preliminary results. Pick up any two
agents, say 1; 2 2 N , and set O = N n f1; 2g. Let v1i ; v0i 2 V be such that
v1i > v
0
i . By ETE and BB, we have for any i 2 N ,
fi(v
0
O[f1;2g) = (
1
n
; 0):
By wDE, SG, and ETE, we have
s1(v
1
1; v
0
O[f2g) = 1:
By Myerson's Lemma, it holds that
t1(v
1
1; v
0
O[f2g) =  
n  1
n
v02:
Then, by ETE and BB, it follows that for any i 6= 1,
fi(v
1
1; v
0
O[f2g) = (0;
1
n
v02):
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So, f(v11; v
0
O[f2g) coincides with the allocation determined by the second price
trading rule. By wDE and ETE, we have
s1(v
1
f1;2g; v
0
O) = s2(v
1
f1;2g; v
0
O) =
1
2
:
By wDE and SG, for any v^2 2 V such that v0i < v^2 < v11, it follows that
s2(v
1
1; v^2; v
0
O) is either 0 or
1
n
.
We claim that for any such v^2, it holds that
s2(v
1
1; v^2; v
0
O) =
1
n
:
Suppose to the contrary that for some v^2 2 V such that v0i < v^2 < v11, it
holds that
s2(v
1
1; v^2; v
0
O) = 0:
Then, by Myerson's Lemma, there exists a 2 V such that v^2  a  v11, and
the following is satised: For any v02 2 V such that v0i < v02 < a, we have
s2(v
1
1; v
0
2; v
0
O) = 0
and for any v02 2 V such that a < v02 < v11, we have
s2(v
1
1; v
0
2; v
0
O) =
1
n
:
Furthermore, Myerson's Lemma gives that
t2(v
1
f1;2g; v
0
O) 6=  (
1
2
  1
n
)v11:
By ETE and BB, it holds that for any i 6= 1; 2,
ti(v
1
f1;2g; v
0
O) 6=
1
n
v11:
By wDE and ETE, we have
s3(v
1
f1;2;3g; v
0
Onf3g) =
1
3
:
By wDE, for any v^3 2 V such that v0i  v^3 < v11, it follows that
s3(v
1
f1;2g; v^3; v
0
Onf3g) = 0:
Then, Myerson's Lemma gives that
t3(v
1
f1;2;3g; v
0
Onf3g) 6=  (
1
3
  1
n
)v11:
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Repeating the same argument, we have
tn(v
1
N) 6=  (
1
n
  1
n
)v11 = 0:
Since, by ETE and BB, it must be tn(v
1
N) = 0, this is contradiction. Thus,
for any v^2 2 V such that v0i < v^2 < v11, it holds that
s2(v
1
1; v^2; v
0
O) =
1
n
:
Then, by Myerson's Lemma, we have
f2(v
1
1; v2; v
0
O) =
(
(1
2
; (1
2
+ 1
n
)v11) if v2 = v
1
1;
( 1
n
; 0) if v11 > v2 > v
0
i :
(3)
The (A0) Part .
Let (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n be such that #C = 1 and #I = 1. We denote I = fi1g
and C = fi2g. From (3), we have fi2(v1I ; vC ; v0O) = ( 1n ; 0). Then, by wDF, we
have
si1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
n  1
n
:
Since, from (3), fi1(v^i1 ; vC ; v
0
O) = (
1
2
; (1
2
  1
n
)vi2) where v^i1 = vi2 , by Myer-
son's Lemma, we have
ti1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =  
n  2
n
vi2 :
Then, by BB and ETE, for any h 2 O, it holds that
fh(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) = (0;
1
n
vi2):
Thus, (A0) is valid.
The (B0) Part .
Let v = (v1I ; v
0
O) 2 V n. When #I = 0 or 1, we have already shown as the
preliminary results. So, consider the case of #I > 1.
Let i; j 2 I. From (3), it follows that
fi(v
1
fi;jg; v
0
O[Infi;jg) = (
1
2
; (1
2
  1
n
)v1i ):
Then, by BB and ETE, for any h 2 O [ I n fi; jg, it follows that
fh(v
1
fi;jg; v
0
O[Infi;jg) = (0;
1
n
v1i );
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that is, f(v1fi;jg; v
0
O[Infi;jg) coincides with the allocation determined by the
second price trading rule. By the similar way, we can show that for any
k 2 I n fi; jg, f(v1fi;j;kg; v0O[Infi;j;kg) coincides with the allocation determined
by the second price trading rule. Repeating the same argument, we have
(B0). Thus, the rst part is valid.
The Second Part .
Given any integer c such that 2  c  n  2. Before proving (A0) and (B0),
we show preliminary results. Let (v1I ; vC0 ; v
0
O) 2 V n be such that #C 0 = c 1
and #I = 1. For simplicity of notation, we denote I = f1g, and v2 as the
highest valuation in C 0. Pick up any agent h 2 O.
Note that by wDE, SG, and ETE, we have
sh(vh; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) =
8><>:
0 if v0h  vh  v2;
0 or 1
n
if v2 < vh < v
1
1;
1
2
if vh = v
1
1:
We claim that for any vh 2 V such that v2 < vh < v11, we have
sh(vh; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) =
1
n
:
Suppose to the contrary that for some v^h 2 V such that v2 < v^h < v11, it
holds that
sh(v^h; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) = 0:
Then, by Myerson's Lemma, there exists a 2 V such that v^h  a  v11, and
the following is satised: For any v0h 2 V such that v0h < v0h < a, we have
sh(v
0
h; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) = 0
and for any v0h 2 V such that a < v0h < v11, we have
sh(v
0
h; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) =
1
n
:
Since, by the induction hypothesis (A), fh(v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
O) = (0;
1
n
v2), Myerson's
Lemma also gives that
th(v
1
I[fhg; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) 6=  (
1
2
  1
n
)v11:
Note that, by wDE, for any j 2 C 0, sj(v1I[fhg; vC0 ; v0Onfhg) = 0. Since, by
the induction hypothesis (B), for any j 2 C 0, fj(v1I[fhg; vC0nfjg; v0O[fjgnfhg) =
(0; 1
n
v11), by strategy-proofness, it holds that
tj(v
1
I[fhg; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) =
1
n
v11:
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By ETE and BB, it holds that for any i 2 O n fhg,
ti(v
1
I[fhg; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) 6=
1
n
v11:
Pick up any agent h0 2 O n fhg. By wDE, SG, and ETE, we have
sh0(v
1
I[fh;h0g; vC0 ; v
0
Onfh;h0g) =
1
3
:
By wDE, for any v^h0 2 V such that v0h0  v^h0 < v11, it follows that
sh0(v^h0 ; v
1
I[fhg; vC0 ; v
0
Onfh;h0g) = 0:
Then, Myerson's Lemma gives that
th0(v
1
I[fh;h0g; vC0 ; v
0
Onfh;h0g) 6=  (
1
3
  1
n
)v11:
Repeating the same argument, we have for any i 2 I [O,
si(v
1
I[O; vC0) =
1
n  (c  1)
and
ti(v
1
I[O; vC0) 6=  (
1
n  (c  1)  
1
n
)v11:
By the induction hypothesis (B) and SP, for any k 2 C 0, it holds that
tk(v
1
I[O; vC0) =
1
n
v11:
These, however, contradict BB. Thus, for any vh 2 V such that v2 < vh < v11,
we have
sh(vh; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) =
1
n
:
Then, by Myerson's Lemma, we have
fh(vh; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) =
8><>:
(0; 1
n
v2) if v
0
h  vh  v2
( 1
n
; 0) if v2 < vh < v
1
1
(1
2
; (1
2
  1
n
)v11) if vh = v
1
1:
(4)
The (A0) Part .
Let v = (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n be such that #C = c and #I = 1. We denote
I = fi1g, and vi2 as the highest valuation in C, that is, i2 2 [2v]. We divide
the argument into two cases.
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The case 1: #[2v] = 1.
From (4), we have fi2(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) = (
1
n
; 0). Then, by wDF, we have
si1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
n  1
n
:
Since, from (4), fi1(v^i1 ; vC ; v
0
O) = (
1
2
; (1
2
  1
n
)vi2) where v^i1 = vi2 , by Myer-
son's Lemma, we have
ti1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =  
n  2
n
vi2 :
Then, for any i 6= i1; i2, it holds that
si(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) = 0:
By the induction hypothesis (A), for any k 2 C n fi2g, it follows that
fk(v
1
I ; vCnfkg; v
0
O[fkg) = (0;
1
n
vi2):
So, by SP, for any k 2 C n fi2g, it holds that
tk(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
1
n
vi2 :
Then, by BB, for any h 2 O, it follows that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
1
n
vi2 :
The case 2: #[2v] > 1.
From (4), for any i 2 [2v], we have fi(v1I ; vC ; v0O) = (0; 1nvi2). Then, by wDF,
we have
si1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) = 1:
Since, by the induction hypothesis (B), fi1(v^i1 ; vC ; v
0
O) = (
1
#[2v ]+1
; ( 1
#[2v ]+1
 
1
n
)vi2) where v^i1 = vi2 , by Myerson's Lemma, we have
ti1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =  
n  1
n
vi2 :
Then, for any i =2 [1v] [ [2v], it holds that
si(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) = 0:
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By the induction hypothesis (A), for any k 2 C n [2v], it follows that
fk(v
1
I ; vCnfkg; v
0
O[fkg) = (0;
1
n
vi2):
So, by SP, for any k 2 C n [2v], it holds that
ti(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
1
n
vi2 :
Then, by BB and ETE, for any h 2 O, it also follows that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
1
n
vi2 :
Thus, (A0) is valid.
The (B0) Part .
Let v = (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n be such that #C = c   1 and I 6= ;. If #I = 1,
then the induction hypothesis (A) implies the conclusion. So, consider the
case of #I > 1.
Let i; j 2 I. Let i2 2 C be such that his valuation vi2 is the highest in C.
From (A0), it holds that
fj(v^j; v
1
i ; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) = (0;
1
n
vi2)
where v^j = vi2 , and that for any v
0
j 2 V such that v1i > v0j > vi2 ,
sj(v
0
j; v
1
i ; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) =
1
n
:
Since, by wDE and ETE, sj(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) =
1
2
, by Myerson's Lemma,
it follows that
tj(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) =  (
1
2
  1
n
)v1i :
Then, for any k 6= i; j, we have
sk(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) = 0:
Note that by the induction hypothesis (B), for any k 2 C, it follows that
fk(v
1
fi;jg; vCnfkg; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O[fkg) = (0;
1
n
v1i ):
So, by SP, for any k 2 C, we have
tk(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) =
1
n
v1i :
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Then, by BB and ETE, for any h 2 O [ I n fi; jg, it also follows that
th(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) =
1
n
v1i ;
that is, f(v1fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) coincides with the allocation determined by
the second price trading rule. By the similar way, we can show that for
any k 2 I n fi; jg, f(v1fi;j;kg; vC ; v0Infi;j;kg; v0O) coincides with the allocation
determined by the second price trading rule. Repeating the same argument,
we have (B0). Thus, the second part is valid. Therefore, this theorem is
valid.
2
7.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Let f be a rule satisfying SP, ERLB, ETE, wDE, and SG. We show that
for any v 2 V n, f(v) coincides with the allocation determined by the second
price trading rule. To do so, we prove the following induction.
1. (A0) For any (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n such that #C = 1 and #I = 1,
f(v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) coincides with the allocation determined by the second
price trading rule.
(B0) For any (v1I ; v
0
O) 2 V n, f(v1I ; v0O) also do.
2. Given any integer c such that 2  c  n  2. If
(A) for any (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n such that #C  c   1 and #I = 1,
f(v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) coincides with the allocation determined by the second
price trading rule, and
(B) for any (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n such that #C  c   2 and I 6= ;,
f(v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) also do, then
(A0) for any (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n such that #C = c and #I = 1, f(v1I ; vC ; v0O)
also do, and
(B0) for any (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n such that #C = c   1 and I 6= ;,
f(v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) also do.
The First Part.
Before proving (A0) and (B0), we show preliminary results. Pick up any two
agents, say 1; 2 2 N , and set O = N n f1; 2g. Let v1i ; v0i 2 V be such that
v1i > v
0
i . By ETE and ERLB, we have for any i 2 N ,
fi(v
0
O[f1;2g) = (
1
n
; 0):
22
By wDE, SG, and ETE, we have
s1(v
1
1; v
0
O[f2g) = 1:
By Myerson's Lemma, it holds that
t1(v
1
1; v
0
O[f2g) =  
n  1
n
v02:
Then, by ETE, ERLB, and feasibility of transfer, it follows that for any i 6= 1,
fi(v
1
1; v
0
O[f2g) = (0;
1
n
v02):
So, f(v11; v
0
O[f2g) coincides with the allocation determined by the second price
trading rules. By wDE and ETE, we have
s1(v
1
f1;2g; v
0
O) = s2(v
1
f1;2g; v
0
O) =
1
2
:
By wDE and SG, for any v^2 2 V such that v0i < v^2 < v11, it follows that
s2(v
1
1; v^2; v
0
O) is either 0 or
1
n
.
We claim that for any such v^2, it holds that
s2(v
1
1; v^2; v
0
O) =
1
n
:
Suppose to the contrary that for some v^2 2 V such that v0i < v^2 < v11, it
holds that
s2(v
1
1; v^2; v
0
O) = 0:
Then, by SP, we have
t2(v
1
1; v^2; v
0
O) =
1
n
v02;
which contradicts ERLB. Thus, for any v^2 2 V such that v0i < v^2 < v11, it
holds that
s2(v
1
1; v^2; v
0
O) =
1
n
:
Then, by Myerson's Lemma, we have
f2(v
1
1; v2; v
0
O) =
(
(1
2
; (1
2
+ 1
n
)v11) if v2 = v
1
1;
( 1
n
; 0) if v11 > v2 > v
0
i :
(5)
The (A0) Part .
Let (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n be such that #C = 1 and #I = 1. We denote I = fi1g
23
and C = fi2g. From (5), we have fi2(v1I ; vC ; v0O) = ( 1n ; 0). Then, by wDF, we
have
si1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
n  1
n
:
Since, from (5), fi1(v^i1 ; vC ; v
0
O) = (
1
2
; (1
2
  1
n
)vi2) where v^i1 = vi2 , by Myer-
son's Lemma, we have
ti1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =  
n  2
n
vi2 :
Then, for any h 2 O, it holds that
sh(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) = 0:
By ETE and feasibility of transfer, for any h 2 O, it also holds that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) 
1
n
vi2 :
We claim that th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
1
n
vi2 . Suppose to the contrary that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) <
1
n
vi2 :
By wDE, SG, and ETE, we have
sh(v^h; v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
Onfhg) = 0;
where v^h = vi2 . Then, by SP, it holds that
th(v^h; v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
Onfhg) = th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) <
1
n
vi2 ;
which contradicts ERLB. So, for any h 2 O, it holds that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
1
n
vi2 :
Thus, (A0) is valid.
The (B0) Part .
Let v = (v1I ; v
0
O) 2 V n. When #I = 0 or 1, we have already shown as the
preliminary results. So, consider the case of #I > 1.
Let i; j 2 I. From (5), it follows that
fi(v
1
fi;jg; v
0
O[Infi;jg) = (
1
2
; (1
2
  1
n
)v1i ):
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For any h 6= i; j, it holds that
sh(v
1
fi;jg; v
0
O[Infi;jg) = 0:
By ETE and feasibility of transfer, for any h 6= i; j, it also follows that
th(v
1
fi;jg; v
0
O[Infi;jg) 
1
n
v1i :
We claim that th(v
1
fi;jg; v
0
O[Infi;jg) =
1
n
v1i . Suppose to the contrary that
th(v
1
fi;jg; v
0
O[Infi;jg) <
1
n
v1i :
By wDE, for any v^h 2 V such that v0h < v^h < v1i , it follows that
sh(v
1
fi;jg; v^h; v
0
O[Infi;j;hg) = 0:
By ETE, we have
sh(v
1
fi;j;hg; v
0
O[Infi;j;hg) =
1
3
:
Then, Myerson's Lemma implies that
th(v
1
fi;j;hg; v
0
O[Infi;j;hg) = th(v
1
fi;jg; v
0
O[Infi;jg) 
1
3
v1i <  (
1
3
  1
n
)v1i ;
which contradicts ERLB. Thus, for any h 6= i; j, it holds that
th(v
1
fi;jg; v
0
O[Infi;jg) =
1
n
v1i ;
that is, f(v1fi;jg; v
0
O[Infi;jg) coincides with the allocation determined by the
second price trading rule. By the similar way, we can show that for any
k 2 I n fi; jg, f(v1fi;j;kg; v0O[Infi;j;kg) coincides with the allocation determined
by the second price trading rule. Repeating the same argument, we have
(B0). Thus, the rst part is valid.
The Second Part .
Given any integer c such that 2  c  n  2. Before proving (A0) and (B0),
we show preliminary results. Let (v1I ; vC0 ; v
0
O) 2 V n be such that #C 0 = c 1
and #I = 1. For simplicity of notation, we denote I = f1g, and v2 as the
highest valuation in C 0. Pick up any agent h 2 O.
Note that by wDE, SG, and ETE, we have
sh(vh; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) =
8><>:
0 if v0h  vh  v2;
0 or 1
n
if v2 < vh < v
1
1;
1
2
if vh = v
1
1:
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We claim that for any vh 2 V such that v2 < vh < v11, we have
sh(vh; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) =
1
n
:
Suppose to the contrary that for some v^h 2 V such that v2 < v^h < v11, it
holds that
sh(v^h; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) = 0:
Since, by the induction hypothesis (A), fh(v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
O) = (0;
1
n
v2), by SP, we
have
th(v^h; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) =
1
n
v2;
which contradicts ERLB. So, for any vh 2 V such that v2 < vh < v11, we have
sh(vh; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) =
1
n
:
Then, by Myerson's Lemma, we have
fh(vh; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
0
Onfhg) =
8><>:
(0; 1
n
v2) if v
0
h  vh  v2
( 1
n
; 0) if v2 < vh < v
1
1
(1
2
; (1
2
  1
n
)v11) if vh = v
1
1:
(6)
The (A0) Part .
Let v = (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n be such that #C = c and #I = 1. We denote
I = fi1g, and vi2 as the highest valuation in C, that is, i2 2 [2v]. We divide
the argument into two cases.
The case 1: #[2v] = 1.
From (6), we have fi2(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) = (
1
n
; 0). Then, by wDF, we have
si1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
n  1
n
:
Since, from (6), fi1(v^i1 ; vC ; v
0
O) = (
1
2
; (1
2
  1
n
)vi2) where v^i1 = vi2 , by Myer-
son's Lemma, we have
ti1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =  
n  2
n
vi2 :
Then, for any i 6= i1; i2, it holds that
si(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) = 0:
By the induction hypothesis (A), for any k 2 C n fi2g, it follows that
fk(v
1
I ; vCnfkg; v
0
O[fkg) = (0;
1
n
vi2):
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So, by SP, for any k 2 C n fi2g, it holds that
tk(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
1
n
vi2 :
We claim that for any h 2 O, it holds that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
1
n
vi2 :
Suppose to the contrary that for some h 2 O, it holds that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) 6=
1
n
vi2 :
If th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) >
1
n
vi2 , then, by ETE, it violates the feasibility of transfer.
So, consider the case of th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) <
1
n
vi2 . By wDE, SG, and ETE, we
have
sh(v^h; v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
Onfhg) = 0;
where v^h = vi2 . Then, by SP, it holds that
th(v^h; v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
Onfhg) = th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) <
1
n
vi2 ;
which contradicts ERLB. So, for any h 2 O, it holds that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
1
n
vi2 :
The case 2: #[2v] > 1.
From (6), for any i 2 [2v], we have fi(v1I ; vC ; v0O) = (0; 1nvi2). Then, by wDF,
we have
si1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) = 1:
Since, by the induction hypothesis (B), fi1(v^i1 ; vC ; v
0
O) = (
1
#[2v ]+1
; ( 1
#[2v ]+1
 
1
n
)vi2) where v^i1 = vi2 , by Myerson's Lemma, we have
ti1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =  
n  1
n
vi2 :
Then, for any i =2 [1v] [ [2v], it holds that
si(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) = 0:
By the induction hypothesis (A), for any k 2 C n [2v], it follows that
fk(v
1
I ; vCnfkg; v
0
O[fkg) = (0;
1
n
vi2):
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So, by SP, for any k 2 C n [2v], it holds that
tk(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
1
n
vi2 :
We claim that for any h 2 O, it holds that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
1
n
vi2 :
Suppose to the contrary that for some h 2 O, it holds that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) 6=
1
n
vi2 :
If th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) >
1
n
vi2 , then, by ETE, it violates the feasibility of transfer.
So, consider the case of th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) <
1
n
vi2 . By wDE, SG, and ETE, we
have
sh(v^h; v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
Onfhg) = 0;
where v^h = vi2 . Then, by SP, it holds that
th(v^h; v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
Onfhg) = th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) <
1
n
vi2 ;
which contradicts ERLB. So, for any h 2 O, it holds that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
0
O) =
1
n
vi2 :
Thus, (A0) is valid.
The (B0) Part .
Let v = (v1I ; vC ; v
0
O) 2 V n be such that #C = c   1 and I 6= ;. If #I = 1,
then the induction hypothesis (A) implies the conclusion. So, consider the
case of #I > 1.
Let i; j 2 I. Let i2 2 C be such that his valuation vi2 is the highest in C.
From (A0), it holds that
fj(v^j; v
1
i ; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) = (0;
1
n
vi2)
where v^j = vi2 , and that for any v
0
j 2 V such that v1i > v0j > vi2 ,
sj(v
0
j; v
1
i ; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) =
1
n
:
Since, by wDE and ETE, sj(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) =
1
2
, by Myerson's Lemma,
it follows that
tj(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) =  (
1
2
  1
n
)v1i :
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Then, for any k 6= i; j, we have
sk(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) = 0:
Note that by the induction hypothesis (B), for any k 2 C, it follows that
fk(v
1
fi;jg; vCnfkg; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O[fkg) = (0;
1
n
v1i ):
So, by SP, for any k 2 C, we have
tk(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) =
1
n
v1i :
We claim that for any h 2 O, it holds that
th(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) =
1
n
v1i :
Suppose to the contrary that for some h 2 O, it holds that
th(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) 6=
1
n
v1i :
If th(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) >
1
n
v1i , then, by ETE, it violates the feasibility of
transfer. So, consider the case of th(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) <
1
n
v1i . By wDE
and ETE, we have
sh(v
1
fi;j;hg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
Onfhg) =
1
3
:
Since, by wDE, for any v0h 2 V such that v1i > v0h > v0h,
sh(v
0
h; v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
Onfhg) = 0;
by Myerson's Lemma, we have
th(v
1
fi;j;hg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
Onfhg) = th(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) 
1
3
v1i <  (
1
3
  1
n
)v1i ;
which contradicts ERLB. So, by ETE, for any h 2 O[I nfi; jg, it holds that
th(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) =
1
n
v1i ;
that is, f(v1fi;jg; vC ; v
0
Infi;jg; v
0
O) coincides with the allocation determined by
the second price trading rule. By the similar way, we can show that for
any k 2 I n fi; jg, f(v1fi;j;kg; vC ; v0Infi;j;kg; v0O) coincides with the allocation
determined by the second price trading rule. Repeating the same argument,
we have (B0). Thus, the second part is valid. Therefore, this theorem is
valid.
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7.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Let f be a mechanism satisfying SP, EF, NTNT, ETE, wDE, and SG. In the
following, for any partition (I; C;X) of N where some set may be empty, we
use the notation v = (v1I ; vC ; v
x
X) in which for any i; j 2 I, any k 2 C, and
any h; h0 2 X, v1i = v1j > vk > vxh = vxh0 , where v1i and vxh are any values in V .
1. (A0) For any C  N such that #C = 1, and any I  N such that
#I = 1, f(v1I ; vC ; v
x
X) coincides with the allocation determined by the
quasi second price mechanism.
(B0) For any I  N , f(v1I ; vxX) also do.
2. Given any integer c such that 2  c  n  1. If
(A) for any C  N such that #C = c   1, and any I  N such that
#I = 1, f(v1I ; vC ; v
x
X) coincides with the allocation determined by the
quasi second price mechanism, and
(B) for any C  N such that #C = c  2, and any non-empty I  N ,
f(v1I ; vC ; v
x
X) also do, then
(A0) for any C  N such that #C = c, and any I  N such that
#I = 1, f(v1I ; vC ; v
x
X) also do, and
(B0) for any C  N such that #C = c  1, and any non-empty I  N ,
f(v1I ; vC ; v
x
X) also do.
The First Part.
Pick up any two agents, say 1; 2 2 N , and set X = N nf1; 2g. Let v11; vx1 2 V
be such that v11 > v
x
1 . By ETE and NTNT, we have for any i 2 N ,
fi(v
x
X[f1;2g) = (
1
n
; 0):
Then, by wDE, SG, and ETE, we have
s1(v
1
1; v
x
X[f2g) = 1:
By Myerson's Lemma, we also have
t1(v
1
1; v
x
X[f2g) =  
n  1
n
vx2 :
Then, by ETE, EF and feasibility of transfer, it follows that for any i 6= 1,
fi(v
1
1; v
x
X[f2g) = (0;
1
n
vx2 ):
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So, f(v11; v
x
X[f2g) coincides with the allocation determined by the quasi second
price mechanism. By wDE, SG, and ETE, we have
s1(v
1
f1;2g; v
x
X) = s2(v
1
f1;2g; v
x
X) =
1
2
:
By wDE and SG, for any v^2 2 V such that vx1 < v^2 < v11, it follows that
s2(v
1
1; v^2; v
x
X) is either 0 or
1
n
.
We claim that for any such v^2, it holds that
s2(v
1
1; v^2; v
x
X) =
1
n
:
Suppose to the contrary that for some v^2 2 V such that vx1 < v^2 < v11, it
holds that
s2(v
1
1; v^2; v
x
X) = 0:
Then, by Myerson's Lemma, there exists a 2 V such that v^2  a  v11, and
the following is satised: For any v02 2 V such that vx1 < v02 < a, we have
s2(v
1
1; v
0
2; v
x
X) = 0
and for any v02 2 V such that a < v02 < v11, we have
s2(v
1
1; v
0
2; v
x
X) =
1
n
:
Furthermore, Myerson's Lemma gives that
t2(v
1
f1;2g; v
x
X) =  (
1
2
  1
n
)v11   (a  vx1 )
1
n
:
If t3(v
1
f1;2g; v
x
X)  1nv11, then agent 1 envies agent 3. So, it must be
t3(v
1
f1;2g; v
x
X) <
1
n
v11:
By wDE, for any v^3 2 V such that vx1 < v^3 < v11, it follows that
s3(v
1
f1;2g; v^3; v
x
Xnf3g) = 0:
By ETE, we have
s3(v
1
f1;2;3g; v
x
Xnf3g) =
1
3
:
Then, Myerson's Lemma implies that
t3(v
1
f1;2;3g; v
x
Xnf3g) = t3(v
1
f1;2g; v
x
X) 
1
3
v11 <  (
1
3
  1
n
)v11:
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If t4(v
1
f1;2;3g; v
x
Xnf3g)  1nv11, then agent 3 envies agent 4. So, it must be
t4(v
1
f1;2;3g; v
x
Xnf3g) >
1
n
v11:
By repeating the same argument, we have
tn(v
1
f1;2;:::;ng) <  (
1
n
  1
n
)v11 = 0:
Since, by ETE, for any i 2 N , si(v1f1;2;:::;ng) = 1n , this contradicts NTNT.
Thus, for any v^2 2 V such that vx1 < v^2 < v11, it holds that
s2(v
1
1; v^2; v
x
X) =
1
n
:
Then, by Myerson's Lemma, we have
f2(v
1
1; v2; v
x
X) =
(
(1
2
; (1
2
+ 1
n
)v11) if v2 = v
1
1;
( 1
n
; 0) if v11 > v2 > v
x
1 :
(7)
The (A0) Part .
Let C  N be such that #C = 1, and I  N be such that #I = 1. Let
v = (v1I ; vC ; v
x
X) 2 V n. We denote I = fi1g and C = fi2g. From (7), we have
fi2(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) = (
1
n
; 0). Then, by wDF, we have
si1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) =
n  1
n
:
Since, from (7), fi1(v^i1 ; vC ; v
x
X) = (
1
2
; (1
2
  1
n
)vi2) where v^i1 = vi2 , by Myer-
son's Lemma, we have
ti1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) =  
n  2
n
vi2 :
Then, for any h 2 X, it holds that
sh(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) = 0:
By ETE and feasibility of transfer, for any h 2 X, it also holds that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) 
1
n
vi2 :
We claim that th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) =
1
n
vi2 . Suppose to the contrary that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) <
1
n
vi2 :
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By wDE, SG, and ETE, it follows that
sh(v
1
I ; vC ; v^h; v
x
Xnfhg) = 0;
where v^h = vi2 . Then, SP implies that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v^h; v
x
Xnfhg) = th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) <
1
n
vi2 :
For k 6= i1; i2; h, by wDE and EF, it follows that
tk(v
1
I ; vC ; v^h; v
x
Xnfhg) = th(v
1
I ; vC ; v^h; v
x
Xnfhg) <
1
n
vi2 :
By repeating the same argument, we have,
th0(v
1
I ; vC ; v^X) <
1
n
vi2 ;
where for any h0 2 X, v^h0 = vi2 . Since f(v11; v^X[fi2g) coincides with the alloca-
tion determined by the quasi second price mechanism, this is a contradiction.
Thus, for any h 2 X, it holds that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) =
1
n
vi2 :
Thus, (A0) is valid.
The (B0) Part .
Let I  N be non-empty set. Let v = (v1I ; vxX) 2 V n. When #I = 1, we
have already shown. So, consider the case of #I > 1.
Let i; j 2 I. From (7), it follows that
fi(v
1
fi;jg; v
x
X[Infi;jg) = (
1
2
; (1
2
  1
n
)v1j ):
Then, for any h 6= i; j, it follows that
sh(v
1
fi;jg; v
x
X[Infi;jg) = 0:
By ETE and feasibility of transfer, for any h 6= i; j, it also follows that
th(v
1
fi;jg; v
x
X[Infi;jg) 
1
n
v1i :
We claim that th(v
1
fi;jg; v
x
X[Infi;jg) =
1
n
v1i . Suppose to the contrary that
th(v
1
fi;jg; v
x
X[Infi;jg) <
1
n
v1i :
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By wDE, for any v^h 2 V such that vx1 < v^h < v11, it follows that
sh(v
1
fi;jg; v^h; v
x
X[Infi;j;hg) = 0:
By ETE, we have
sh(v
1
fi;j;hg; v
x
X[Infi;j;hg) =
1
3
:
Then, Myerson's Lemma implies that
th(v
1
fi;j;hg; v
x
X[Infi;j;hg) = th(v
1
fi;jg; v
x
X[Infi;jg) 
1
3
v1i <  (
1
3
  1
n
)v1i :
For k 6= i; j; h, if tk(v1fi;j;hg; vxX[Infi;j;hg)  1nv1i , then agent h envies agent k.
So, it must be
tk(v
1
fi;j;hg; v
x
X[Infi;j;hg) <
1
n
v1i :
By repeating the same argument, we have
tn(v
1
f1;2;:::;ng) <  (
1
n
  1
n
)v1i = 0:
Since, by ETE, for any i 2 N , si(v1f1;2;:::;ng) = 1n , this contradicts NTNT.
Thus, for any h 6= i; j, it holds that
th(v
1
fi;jg; v
x
X[Infi;jg) =
1
n
v1i ;
that is, f(v1fi;jg; v
x
X[Infi;jg) coincides with the allocation determined by the
quasi second price mechanism. By the same way, we can show that for any
k 2 I n fi; jg, f(v1fi;j;kg; vxX[Infi;j;kg) coincides with the allocation determined
by the quasi second price mechanism. By repeating the same argument, we
have (B0). Thus, the rst part is valid.
The Second Part .
Given any integer c such that 2  c  n   1. Let C 0  N be such that
#C 0 = c   1. Let I  N be such that #I = 1. Let (v1I ; vC0 ; vxX) 2 V n. For
simplicity of notation, we denote I = f1g, and v2 as the highest valuation in
C 0. Pick up any agent h 2 X.
Note that by wDE, SG, and ETE, we have
sh(vh; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
x
Xnfhg) =
8><>:
0 if vxh  vh  v2;
0 or 1
n
if v2 < vh < v
1
1;
1
2
if vh = v
1
1:
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We claim that for any vh 2 V such that v2 < vh < v11, we have
sh(vh; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
x
Xnfhg) =
1
n
:
Suppose to the contrary that for some v^h 2 V such that v2 < v^h < v11, it
holds that
sh(vh; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
x
Xnfhg) = 0:
Then, by Myerson's Lemma, there exists a 2 V such that v^h  a  v1, and
the following is satised: For any v0h 2 V such that vxh < v0h < a, we have
sh(v
0
h; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
x
Xnfhg) = 0
and for any v0h 2 V such that a < v0h < v11, we have
sh(v
0
h; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
x
Xnfhg) =
1
n
:
Since, by the induction hypothesis (A), fh(v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
x
X) = (0;
1
n
v2), Myerson's
Lemma also gives that
th(v
1
I[fhg; vC0 ; v
x
Xnfhg) =  (
1
2
  1
n
)v11  
1
n
(a  v2):
Note that, by wDE, for any j 2 C 0, sj(v1I[fhg; vC0 ; vxXnfhg) = 0. Since, by
the induction hypothesis (B), for any j 2 C 0, fj(v1I[fhg; vC0nfjg; vxX[fjgnfhg) =
(0; 1
n
v11), by strategy-proofness, it holds that
tj(v
1
I[fhg; vC0 ; v
x
Xnfhg) =
1
n
v11:
These imply that agent h envies agent j. Thus, for any vh 2 V such that
v2 < vh < v
1
1, we have
sh(vh; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
x
Xnfhg) =
1
n
:
Then, by Myerson's Lemma, we have
fh(vh; v
1
I ; vC0 ; v
x
Xnfhg) =
8><>:
(0; 1
n
v2) if v
x
h  vh  v2
( 1
n
; 0) if v2 < vh < v
1
1
(1
2
; (1
2
  1
n
)v11) if vh = v
1
1:
(8)
The (A0) Part .
Let C  N be such that #C = c, and I  N be such that #I = 1. Let
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v = (v1I ; vC ; v
x
X) 2 V n. We denote I = fi1g, and vi2 as the highest valuation
in C, that is, i2 2 [2]. We divide the argument into two cases.
The case 1: #[2] = 1.
From (8), we have fi2(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) = (
1
n
; 0). Then, by wDF, we have
si1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) =
n  1
n
:
Since, from (8), fi1(v^i1 ; vC ; v
x
X) = (
1
2
; (1
2
  1
n
)vi2) where v^i1 = vi2 , by Myer-
son's Lemma, we have
ti1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) =  
n  2
n
vi2 :
Then, for any i 6= i1; i2, it holds that
si(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) = 0:
By the induction hypothesis (A), for any k 2 C n fi2g, it follows that
fk(v
1
I ; vCnfkg; v
x
X[fkg) = (0;
1
n
vi2):
So, by SP, for any k 2 C n fi2g, it holds that
tk(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) =
1
n
vi2 :
Then, by EF, for any h 2 X, it follows that
th(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) =
1
n
vi2 :
The case 2: #[2] > 1.
From (8), for any i 2 [2], we have fi(v1I ; vC ; vxX) = (0; 1nvi2). Then, by wDF,
we have
si1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) = 1:
Since, by the induction hypothesis (B), fi1(v^i1 ; vC ; v
x
X) = (
1
#[1^]
; ( 1
#[1^]
  1
n
)vi2)
where v^i1 = vi2 and #[1^] is at (v^i1 ; vC ; v
x
X), by Myerson's Lemma, we have
ti1(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) =  
n  1
n
vi2 :
Then, by wDE and EF, for any i =2 [1] [ [2], it holds that
fi(v
1
I ; vC ; v
x
X) = (0;
1
n
vi2):
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Thus, (A0) is valid.
The (B0) Part .
Let C  N be such that #C = c   1, and I  N be non-empty set. Let
v = (v1I ; vC ; v
x
X) 2 V n. If #I = 1, then the induction hypothesis (A) implies
the conclusion. So, consider the case of #I > 1.
Let i; j 2 I. Let i2 2 C be such that his valuation vi2 is the highest in C.
From (A0), it holds that
fj(v^j; v
1
i ; vC ; v
x
Infi;jg; v
x
X) = (0;
1
n
vi2)
where v^j = vi2 , and that for any v
0
j 2 V such that v1i > v0j > vi2 ,
sj(v
0
j; v
1
i ; vC ; v
x
Infi;jg; v
x
X) =
1
n
:
Since, by wDE and ETE, sj(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
x
Infi;jg; v
x
X) =
1
2
, by Myerson's Lemma,
it follows that
tj(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
x
Infi;jg; v
x
X) =  (
1
2
  1
n
)v1i :
Then, for any k 6= i; j, we have
sk(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
x
Infi;jg; v
x
X) = 0:
Note that by the induction hypothesis (B), for any k 2 C,
fk(v
1
fi;jg; vCnfkg; v
x
Infi;jg; v
x
X[fkg) = (0;
1
n
v1i ):
So, by SP, for any k 2 C, we have
tk(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
x
Infi;jg; v
x
X) =
1
n
v1i :
Then, by EF, for any h 2 X [ I n fi; jg, it also follows that
th(v
1
fi;jg; vC ; v
x
Infi;jg; v
x
X) =
1
n
v1i ;
that is, f(v1fi;jg; vC ; v
x
Infi;jg; v
x
X) coincides with the allocation determined by
the quasi second price mechanism. By the same way, we can show that for
any k 2 I n fi; jg, f(v1fi;j;kg; vC ; vxInfi;j;kg; vxX) coincides with the allocation
determined by the quasi second price mechanism. By repeating the same
argument, we have (B0). Thus, the second part is valid. Therefore, this
theorem is valid.
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